~0. Introduction. The idea of treating probability as a real valued function defined on sentences is an old one (see ['6] and [7] , where other references can be found). Carnap's attempt to set up a theory of probability which will have a logical status analogous to that of two valued logic, is closely connected with it, ef. [1] . So far the sentences were used mainly from a "Boolean algebraic" point of view, that is, the operations that were involved were those of the sentential calculus. (The work of Carnap and his collaborators does, however, touch on probabilities which are defined for special cases of first order monadic sentences.)
§1. Measures. Consider a first-order predicate calculus ~, that is, a system consisting of individual variables, individual constants and predicate constants, as well as the sentential connectives ~, V, A , -~, -and the first order quantifiers t and V. ~ may or may not be with an equality. Let C be any set of individual constants, not necessarily belonging to ~3. ~(C) is the set of all formulas formed using the individual variables, the predicates, the connectives and quantifiers of~3, and the individual constants of C. g(C) is the set of all sentences (i.e., formulas without free variables) of ~(C). ~o(C) is the subset of ~(C) consisting of all formulas in which no quantifier occurs, and go(C) = ~:o(C) n g(C).
(Thus if C = ¢, go(C) = ¢). 'k~' means that tk is logically valid. Now let C be the set of individual constants of ~.
By a measure on ~3 we mean a function # defined on a subset of g(C) having non-negative real numbers as values, and not vanishing identically, such that the domain of It, D#, is closed under sentential operations (i.e. if c~,~ e D# then ~c~, ?p V d/ etc. belong to DI~) and the following holds for all ~,¢eO#: (1) If t-~ and ~-~ then #(c~) =#(¢) (2) If k ~ (dp A ~O) then #(dp V ~) = #((a) + #(~b)
(1) and (2) imply: (1') If t~, ~b e D# and t-~b -~O then #(qb) = kt(~). (2) together with the requirement/t(~b) = 0 whenever I-~ 4~ do not suffice to get (1')).
Proof. If t-tk
Thus, a measure can be conceived as a non-trivial, non-negative, finitely additive measure on a Boolean subalgebra of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the sentences of~,the subalgebra being {~k/= l ~k e D#}, where ~k/---= {q5 [ t-q~ -~k}.
A probability on ~3 is a measure #for which #(~b)= 1 wheneoerc~ eD# and t-c~.
One can consider also measures defined for formulas containing free variables as well, this however makes no essential difference, the statements and constructions which follow can be modifiedin an obvious way to take care of this case.
The notion of a probability is advanced here as a natural generalization to that of a theory. Whereas in the case of a theory one speaks of sentences as being true or false, in the case of a probability a sentence has a certain probability which might in general be any number between 0 and 1. A theory is a probability having only two values 0 and 1, the theory being complete if the domain of the probability is the set of all sentences. This analogy motivates the following definition of a measure-model. §2 . Measure-models and the completeness theorem. Let C be the set of individual constants of ~
. A measure-model for ~3 is a pair (U,m), where U ~C,U v~ O, and m is a measure on 6o (U). (U,m) is a probability-model iJ m is a probability.
A usual model consists in giving an interpretation to the predicates of the calculus as relations over a certain set U. This might be also described as a function assigning the values 0 or 1 to every expression of the form R(a 1,'", a,) where R is an n-place predicate of ~3 and al,'", a, • U. In generalizing this we consider a function having values in [0, 1] , but this in itself is not sufficient, since, in general, the values assigned to atomic sentences do not determine unique values for sentential combinations of these sentences. Hence one has to start from a probability defined on the whole of ~0(U). This, as it turns out, does determine a natural extension to ~(U). Proof. Since every measure can be made into a probability through multiplying by a normalizing factor it suffices to prove the theorem assuming that m is a probability. It is easily seen that (3) is equivalent to: (3') If ~b(xl, "",xk)• ~(U) and xx, "-,xk are all its free variables then
For every U' __q U let ~,(U') be the subset of ~(U') consisting of those formulas which are in prenex normal form with no more than n alternating blocks of quantifiers and, in case n > 0 and there are n blocks, the leftmost one consists of existential quantifiers. Let II,(U') be likewise defined except that in the case of n blocks, where n > 0, the leftmost one is required to be a block of universal quantifiers. Now assume m* and m* both extend m and satisfiy (3' (ai,l,'",ai,k) are in H,(U) and every disjunction of sentences from H,(U) is logically equivalent to a sentence of H,(U), hence (3') implies that m*(~b) = m*z(~) • If ffeII.+l(U)n~(U ) then ~g, is logically equivalent to a member of ]~.+I(U) n~(U) hence m* and m* coincide on ~ ~k and therefore also on ft. It follows by induction that m* and m~ coincide on all sentences in [March ~n(U), H,,(U), n = 0,1, .... Since every sentence is logically equivalent to a sentence in prenex normal form we get m*= m*.
To prove the existence of m* we distinguish first the case where U is countable (i.e., of power < ~¢o). Let ~ be the set of all models (in the usual sense) whose universe is U (i.e., systems of the form (U,...)). For every ~b e ~(U) let ~/(~) be the set of all models in which ~b is satisfied. ~1/(~ V ¢)=~ff/(ff)U~IJ/(~k) and ~J~(,~b) =9J/-~g/(q~), hence {9J/(~) I q~ ~ ~o(U)} is a Boolean algebra of subsets of 9J/and m induces on it a finitely additive measure m l given by: m l(~l~(~b)) = m(~b). ml is continuous, by which we mean that if X~, i = 1, 2,..., is a sequence of sets of the Boolean algebra such that Xt+1 ---X~, i = 1,2, ..., and N~=IX~ = ¢ then lim~_.o~m~(X~) = 0. If U is finite this is obvious. If U is infinite then it follows from the compactness theorem for the sentential calculus, which states that, for q~o(U), i= 1,2,..., either there is an n for which ~-n for dp(xl, "",Xk) e IIn(U), and m*(~b) = 1 -m*((~ if)*) for ¢ e rl~(U).
Extend m* to ~(U) by putting ,m*(¢) = m*(¢*). It remains to show that m* is a measure on ~(U).
For every U' ~ U let my, be the restriction of m to ~o(U'). If U' is countable then my, has an extension m*, defined on ~(U') and satisfying (3) with respect to U'. If Tis any set of predicates of the calculus let ~r(U') be the set of all the sentences of ~(U') all of whose predicates are in T. If U~ _~ U2 and br~ =< Ro, then U2 is said to be an n-elementary extension of U~ with respect to T if m*2(~b ) = m*,(q~) for all ~b ~ ~n(U~). t3 ~r(U~), (from whichit follows that this is also true for all ~b~I-I~(u~)n~r(u~)). Obviously if Ua is an n-elementary extension of U:, and U2 and n-elementary extension of U:, all with respect to T, then Ua is an n-elementary extension of U~. Let U~, i = 1,2,..., be countable subsets of U such that Ui + ~ is an n-elementary extension of Ui, i = 1,2,..., oo U all with respect to some fixed T, then, as we shall see, Uoo = [,_)i = 1 i is an n-elementary extension of each U~.
* on 1-10(Ui) n~r(Ui). Assume
First it is obvious that rn~o o coincides with each my, it coincides with each m*, on 1-Ij(Ui) n ~r(Ui), j < n. Let ~b(Xa, "",xk) e IIg(Ui), .assume all its predicates are in T and X~,'",Xk are its free variables, for simplicity take k = 1. ~m* "~/ " 14~(a,)) Finally we claim that given any n, any countable subset U' of U, and any countable set Tof predicates,there is a countable W ~ U' such that m* coincides with m* on ]~,(W) n ~r(W). If n = 0 put W= U'. Assume it to be true for n. The inductive definition of m* which is based on (3') and used in the proof for the case in which U is uncountable, can be used to prove the theorem directly for both countable and uncountable U's; one has to show that m* is a measure, and this can be done by defining the transformation tk -~ ~b * in some particular suitable way, and using for the case where U is infinite some versions of Herbrand's theorem.
Note that the notion of an elementary submodel can be carried over to the case of measure-models as indicated in the proof of the theorem.
Thus we get:
is a submodel of(U,m) iS U 1 =_ U and ml is m restricted to ~o(U1). It is an elementary submodel if it is a submodel and, for all c~ ~ ~(U1), m*(gp) = m*(c~), where m* and m* are the unique extensions of m and ml satisfying (3)for U and U1, respectively.
(If (U~,m~) is to be a measure-model for the same calculus an additional stipulation should be made, to the effect that all individual constants of the calculus belong to U1.)
The techniques involving elementary measure-submodels, of which some were used in the proof, are fully analogous to the techniques used for ordinary models, in particular:
If (U,m) is a measure-model and U' _ U then U'can be extended to U" so that, if m" is m restricted to U",then (U", m") is an elementary submodel of ( U, m ). U" can be chosen to be of power not exceeding the maximum of No, U', and the power of the family of predicates of the calculus.
As was pointed out in the proof of Theorem 1, every measure-mode! (U, m) induces a measure on the Boolean algebra {M(q~)I~b e~o(U)},where M(~)is the set of all ordinary models with domain U in which qb is satisfied. This measure is continuous and can be extended to a count=ably additive measure on the a-field generated by this Boolean algebra. In case U < N O this a-field contains all sets M(qS) where ~ z ~(U), and m*(~) is equal to the value of the extension for M(~b). , dp e6(U), satisfies (3). This is no longer true if U > No, since in that case every finitely additive measure on {M(~)[~ e 6(U)} is continuous and can be extended to a countably additive measure on the ~r-field, while one can easily construct measures on 6(U) which do not satisfy (3) .
A measure-model (U,m) is said to determine the measure It (on ~), if# is the restriction of m* to Dit, where m* is the unique extension of m satisfying(3). (U,m) is said to be a model of It if it determines p.
The following analogy to the completeness theorem holds.
TH~OP,~M 2. Every measure .u on ~ has a measure-model whose power is No + the power of the set of all sentences of ~3.
The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proof of the completeness theorem which uses the prime ideal theorem to extend an ideal in the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra to a prime ideal. Here we extend a measure on a subalgebra to a measure on the whole algebra. We quote the following result [8, pp. 268-270] . We formulate the theorem in terms of probability rather then measure only for the sake of convenience. The theorem remains true if 'probability' is replaced, throughout, by 'measure' provided that, in (6) '1' is replaced by It(~bV ~~b), where ~b e D#.
Proof. The necessity of (5) is obvious. Since t-A~<~A~__<~+~(a~ a~)--} ~ ~x~-.. x~ Vy(V~= ~y -x~)(where "at ~ a/" stands for "'~ a~ = a,"), it follows that if (U,m)
is a probability-model with strict equality then m*(,~ ~xt...x~Vy(V~=ly =x~))= 1 whenever m* is an extension of m and k < rff. If k > U, say U = {a~, ...,a~}, k >_-j, then F V~=t a = a~ for all a e U, hence if m* is the unique extension of m satisfying (3), m*(Vy(V~ = ~ y ---a~)) = 1, which implies m* (~Xx "" xz Vy (V~tY " x~)) = 1. Therefore (6) is necessary.
The sutticiency of (5) and (6) follows from: (7) Let U be any set of individual constants and m a probability on ~(U) satisfying (6) Once (7) is proved the proof of the existence of a probability-model with strict equality follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 2. Namely, putting Co = C we define C~ as before, and we keep adding step by step the new constants a¢ and extending the probability according to (7) , so as to make it satisfy (3) for the particular sentence ~b. This is done for every Ct by transfinite induction. Either we get at some stage a probability already satisfying (3) or else the process C can be carried on and we get such a probability on [..J~=0 ~. The probabilitymodel thus constructed determines/t and is with strict equality.
Proof of (7) We claim the following statement: (8) If ~' is a Boolean algebra, ~I a subalgebra, mo a measure on ~1, and Yt,~2,"" a sequence of members of ~' such that Yi-~ Yi+l, i = 1,2,..., then mo can be extended to a measure m' on ~B' so that m'(?~)= m+(?t) for all ~,~ (rn~" is defined in (4)).
To prove it we use (4). Let ~B t be the subalgebra generated by ~1 and {?l, "",?~}. First extend mo to a measure m t on B 1 so that m1(6 "~1) = m~ (6"?1) for all 6 • ~x ; continue this process, extending rn~ to a measure ms+ x on ~3 i+ t so = mi (6 "?~+1) for all 6 • ~B ~. Finally let moo be the measure that ml+x(6"?i+x) + defined on [,,j~o= I~B~ which coincides with each mi on ~3 ~ , and take m' to be any extension of moo to ~B'. All that is required to show is that m+_l(~i)= m~ (?l), Note that, unlike the proof of Theorem 2, the construction used in this proof does not guarantee that for every ~x~(x) there is a member a of U for which m*(]x~(x)) = m* (¢(a) ). This is no accident. Given any n, one can construct a measure It on a first-order calculus which consists of an equality and finitely many monadic predicates, so that p has measure-models with strict equality, but for every measure-model (U, m), of It, which is with strict equality, there is at least one predicate P, of the calculus, such that p(3xP(x)) > rn(V.~.i~P(ai)), for all at, ...,an_ t ~ U. We give the construction without the proof. The monadic predicates are P1,...,Pn(~_l)2+l and Qs, where S ranges over all subsets of {1,2,-.-,n(n-1) 2 + 1} whose power is n. # is any measure having measuremodels with strict equality and satisfying the following: /a(3xP~(x))= 1 and show that such measures exist and the easiest way of doing it is to construct a measure-model with strict equality which determines a measure satisfying these equations.
On the other hand if ~ has countably many sentences and finitely many individual constants, and # has measure-models with strict equality, then It has also a measure-model (U, m), with strict equality, such that, for all 3xt~(x)in ~(U), there are al,...,ak in U for which m*(3x~b(x))= m*(\/ik=t~b(a~)). This follows from a slight modification of the proof of Theorem 3. Consider the sets C~, i= 1,2,..., since ~ has countably many sentences each of them would be countable, hence one can arrange e~tct in a sequence. One proceeds now to extend the measure by adding at each step the first a, (in the sequence) for which all the constants a¢ which occur in ~b were added before. Since by adding aaxc,(x) the measure is made to satisfy (3) with respect to ~x$(x), and since after each addition we still get a measure whose domains are all the sentences on a finite set of individual constants (the set of individual constants of ~3 is assumed to be finite), it follows that the measure-model one gets has the required property.
The above mentioned assertion is not true if ~ has infinitely many individual constants. Let P be a monadic predicate of ~3 and consider a measure It such that #(Vx,y(P(x) A P(y)-~ x = y)) = 1 and #(P(ai)) = el where at, i = t,2,..., are individual constants of ~, 8~ > 0 for all i, and ~i ez = 1. It is easily seen that # has measure-models with strict equality, but in every model (U,m) of this kind m*(3xP(x))> m(V~klp(bi))for all bt,...,bke U. The assertion is also not true if ~3 has no individual constants but uncountably many predicates. Let {P~,Q~}a<,o~ be the family of monadic predicates of ~, where col is the first uncountable ordinal. For every 0 < 2 < co~ let {ea,~}~<a be a set of real numbers such that ca., > 0 for all v < 2 and ~,<aea. v = 1. One can show that there are measure models with strict equality determining a measure # such that:
It(3xPx(x)) = 1 for all 2 < col, It(3x(P~(x) A P~(x)) = 0 whenever 2 ~ v, It( Vx, y(Qz(x) A Qx(y) ~ x = y)) = 1 for all 2 < cot, and #(Vx(P,(x) ~ Q~(x))) = ca., for all 0 < v < 2 < ~. One can also show that if (U,m) is such a model then thereare co t many 2's such that m*(3xQa(x)) > m(V~= t Oa(b~))for all bl, ...,b, e U.
As is easily seen, a probability # on ~ (not necessarily defined on all the sentences) has a probability-model with strict equality iff some extension of it to the whole set of sentences of ~ has such a model. [March A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an extension satisfying (5) is:
(9) If~b e D# and I-~b -* ~/~ffi i as --b~, where at, bl e C and at ~ bi for 1 < i ~ n, then p(~b) = 0.
Put xk= 3Xx...x~Vy(V~=ly ffi xi). A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an extension satisfying (6) is:
(10) If~bl,~b 2 e D# and, for some k, ~-~bt ~ xk and [-x~-~b2, then P(~x) > 0 implies #(tk2 ) = 1.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an extension satisfying (5) and (6) is:
(11) For all ~bl,~b2eD# and all k, if I-AT=t(al~b ~) A~bl~k and i-~--.V~ffil(a~=b~) V~b2, where a~,b~eC and alibi for l~i~n, then p(~) > 0 implies #(q~2) = 1.
The proofs of these statements use,' (4) and techniques similar to those employed hitherto; they are omitted here.
All this holds for measures provided that "1" is replaced by "~u(~ V "" ~b)". §4. Symmetric measure-models. If !~ has an equality, then the measure-model constructed in the proof of Theorem 4 is not with a strict equality. In fact,there are measures # on first order calculi with equality, having countably many sentences, which do not have measure-models symmetric in U-C with strict equality. For example, let !~ have only one one.place predicate P and equality. Let # be a measure on ~ such If ~ is the set of sentences of ~ we get, for every ~e ~, m*(~b) = m*(~b A ~b) = (m*(~b)) 2, hence m*(~b) is either 0 or 1. Therefore (U,m> is a measure-model of a complete theory. Note that this is some kind of zero-one law, however, the author does not see a way to deduce it directly as a special case of the zeroone law in probability theory.
To find out what complete theory is determined by (U, m) proceed as follows. Assume ~ has an equality. Let x 1,"', xn be distinct variables of ~. By a complete diagram of xl,'",xn we mean a consistent conjunction of atomic formulas and negations of atomic formulas formed by using xl, ...,x~ and the predicates belonging to some finite set ~ (which does not include -) so that, for every k-place predicate R of ~ and every sequence il,'", ik, 1 < ij < n, ( A a2(x~,...,x,,y) )) = 1 whenever al and a2 are complete diagrams and a2 extends try. Let • be the set of all the sentences of these forms. Every member of • is a theorem in the complete theory. Moreover • is a set of axioms for this theory. To see it take the case where ~3 has finitely many predicates. In that case two countable models (in the usual sense) in which • holds are isomorphic. One proves this using the argument which proves the isomorphism of two countable dense linear orderings without extreme elements. The basic fact here is that given any isomorphism between two finite submodels and extending one of them by adding any extra element, one can add a suitable element to the other and extend the isomorphism to the bigger submodels. This follows directly from tI).
A model for this theory can be described as "most general" in the sense that every possible finite model is realised there as a submodel, and for every finite submodel every possible finite extension of it is realised.
If ~ has infinitely many predicates the same holds for all subtheories obtained by restriction to a finite family of predicates. However, there will always be two countable models for the theory which are not isomorphic.
If ~ is without identity but has at least one k-place predicate, where k :>2, then the situation is essentially the same. One gets a similar set, ~, except that in the sentences the part A,'=lY~ x~ is to be omitted. Let ~' be the calculus obtained by adding an equality to ~. Assume, for simplicity, that R is a 2-place predicate of ~3. If trx(X 1, ...,x,) is a complete diagram in which R occurs, and ,'",x,,Y', y) ), but this, in !~', logically imples Vx~, ..., x,3y(tri(x~,...,x,) A i= ly ~ xi A trz(Xl,'", x,, y)). Since every complete diagram in which R does not occur is logically equivalent to a disjunction of complete diagrams in which R occurs, the same holds if R does not occur in tr 1 . Therefore all the properties of the case in which we have equality carry over to this case.
If !~ has no equality and all its predicates are one-place predicates, then the theory has as axioms all the sentences 3x~b(x) where tk(x ) is any consistent quantifier free formula. In case of a finite number of predicates this theory has finite models as well.
There is an easy way to eliminate quantifiers in the complete theory [determined by(U, m). Let ~ be a quantifier-free formula with free variables x a, "", x,, y. n dr It is logically equivalent to a formula of the form ao V Vi=l( i A z~(y)) where y does not occur in a~, 0 < i < n, y occurs in every atomic formula which is a part of zi(y), 1 < i < n, I-Vxl, ..., Xk ~ (a~ A %) whenever i ~ j, and zi(y) is not a tautology, 1 < i <-n. Now let a~, z'i be obtained by some fixed replacement of X~,'.',Xk by members of U. An easy calculation shows that Consequently Vy¢(y) is equivalent in the theory to ao. The elimination is effective since, given ~, one can find ~o effectively. Note that the theory one gets does not depend on the particular q with which one starts, provided only that 0 < q < 1. The argument which was used to prove that (U, m) determines a complete theory can be used to prove that any measuremodel satisfying the following requirements determines a complete theory.
(I) (U,m) is symmetric in U and U is infinite• (II) If ~b,~9 ~ ~o(U) and no individual constant occurs in both then
